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medial processes; whereas, any employee who engaged in self-help against such
conduct would be subject to summary dismissal irrespective of the employer's
conduct. Furthermore, the employees would lose their right to strike against
unfair practices during the critical contract renegotiation period when the strength
of their bargaining agent is most important, even though they admittedly have
such right prior to the sixty-day period, and at any time if they are not covered
by a collective agreement. Thus the union, by bargaining at all, is precluded
from protecting its very existence during the bargaining period.
Conceding that the Eightieth Congress had set a high value on peaceful
settlement of labor disputes, it does not necessarily follow that this enactment
was intended to adopt the extremes that might be enacted in furtherance of
such policy. It appears to the writer that the result reached by the dissent is
incongruous and unreasonable, and the majority view is to be preferred, in light
of the declared legislative policy underlying the NLRA, as amended, namely:
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce... by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
61 STAT. 136 (1947) 29 U. S. C.
full freedom of association .....
§151 (1952).
John Stenger

Labor Law: Federalv. State JurisdictionTo Enjoin Unfair Labor Practices
Appellant union was enjoined by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
from committing unfair labor practices within the Wisconsin Employment Peace
ACT WISCONSIN STAT. c. 111, §§111.04, 111.06, 111.07 (1953). The conduct
subject to the cease and desist order consisted of mass picketing, violence and
overt threats of violence and as such constituted coercion and was therefore within
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. 61 STAT. 140-143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§157,158 (b) (1) (A) (1952). Held (6-3): the state board could
enjoin violent conduct as a valid exercise of its police power. United Automobile
Workers, CIO v. W.E.R.B., 351 U. S. 266 (1956).
While the boundary between exclusive federal jurisdiction and state jurisdiction in the field of labor relations has not been clearly delineated, it cannot be
questioned that rigid restrictions have been impressed upon the jurisdiction of the
states over industrial controversies. A state may not, in furtherance of its labor
policy, enjoin unfair labor practices in areas where the NLRB would accept
jurisdiction. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953). Nor may a state,
in furtherance of policies not associated with labor, enjoin such conduct as, e.g.,
a restraint of trade. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 (1955). Yet

RECENT DECISIONS
the fact that conduct may fall within the NLRA, as amended, does not automatically prevent state action of any type. Undoubtedly a violation of law and
order could result in the valid infliction of criminal sanctions. Allen-Bradley v.
W.E.R.B., 315 U. S. 740 (1942). A common law tort action for damages, based
on conduct constituting an unfair labor practice within the NLRA, as amended,
but outside the scope of its remedies, was upheld in United Construction Workers,
UMW v-.Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U. S. 656 (1954). However, it must
be remembered that neither the imposition of state criminal power nor compensation under Laburnum involves a duplication or conflict of remedy with the NLRA,
as amended. Thus, in the instant case, the Court was squarely faced with the
question whether or not a state labor board could issue a valid cease and desist
order with respect to conduct, admittedly violent, but which nevertheless could
have been subject to a similar order by the NLRB.
The majority, in upholding the action of the state board, based its decision
on the obligatory interest of the states as "the natural guardians of the public
against violence." 351 U. S. at 274. They reasoned that the fact that a union
commits a federal unfair labor practice while engaging in violent conduct should
not prevent the state from taking any steps to stop the violence. 351 U. S. at 274,
275. Reliance was also had on the pre-Taft-Hartley decision in Allen-Bradley v.
W.E.R.B., 315 U. S. 740 (1942), not only because there an injunction against
similar conduct was upheld, but further because the Congressional awareness of
that case was indicative of the legislative intent, in enacting the Taft-Hartley
amendments of 1947, not to foreclose state action in matters of "genuine local
concern." 351 U. S. at 273, 274.
The union argued that since the state can exercise its criminal power to
avert emergencies, it should not be allowed to exercise this police power through
an agncy that is concerned only with labor relations and thereby create a conflict
with federal policy as developed by the NLRB. The Court's answer was direct
and unequivocal. Since the conduct here involved was admittedly within the
police power of the state, it is obvious that the NLRA, as amended, was not to
be the exclusive method of controlling such conduct. 351 U. S. at 272.
The recognition of this injunction imposed by a state board ostensibly represents a deviation from the "conflict of remedies" test postulated in the Garner
case. There the Court pointed out that the NLRA, as amended, did not represent
a substantive rule of law to be administered by various judicial or administrative
bodies, since a multiplicity of tribunals and diverse procedures have a natural
tendency to produce conflicting adjudications. 346 U. S. 485, 490-491. Had the
Court stopped there, the divergence in the instant case would have been manifest.
However, by way of dictum, the Court in the Garner case declared that it was not
deciding a case involving conduct constituting a breach of the state's peace calling
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for extraordinary police measures. Thus the decision in the instant case might
have been foreseen by the juxtaposition of the decisions in Allen-Bradley, Laburnum, and the dictum in the Garner case.
The dissenters were concerned solely with the departure from Garner and
the probability of federal-state conflict. 351 U. S. at 276. Since the character of
such conflict was not articulated in the dissent, one can only speculate as to the
nature of their fears. It would seem that the danger does not lie in direct conflicts
with the NLRA, as amended, such as the issuance by a state board of an order
affecting, for example, the status of employees, foreclosure of rights to collective
bargaining or the equation of peaceful picketing as violent, since such action
would eventually be struck down as irreconcilable with the purposes of the federal
statute. United Construction Workers, UMW v. Laburnum Construction Corp.,
347 U. S. 656 (1954); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953). Thus,
to them, the danger must be indirect and arise from the nature of the administrative and judicial processes. Should a state labor board erroneously issue injunctive relief against conduct within the prohibitory or protective scope of the NLRA,
as amended, the consequent injury to an opposing party might well be irreparable
and the delay incident to appellate litigation could make reparation ineffectual.
It is submitted that since any erroneous adjudication is productive of some delay
and conesquent injury, the dissents point may be that as a result of this decision
the door is opened to an increase in the instances of such delay and injury. If so,
the point seems well taken.
Although the point was not raised by either majority or dissent, it is interesting to note that Wisconsin has a provision similar to section 876(a) New
York Civil Practice Act, which permits an injunction to issue from a court upon
a findng that, inter alia, the conduct, incident to a labor dispute, is beyond the
protection of local law enforcement officers. WISCONSIN STAT. C. 103, §103.56
(1945).
The writer believes that the existence of the above statute casts
doubt on the validity of the majority's statement that to deny the state labor
board power in -this instance would leave the state "powerless to avert emergencies." 351 U. S. at 275. Such remedy by court action is clearly within the
ambit of the NLRA, as amended. See H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Con., 1st Sess.
52. However, the fact that this additional remedy exists was not apparently decisive
of the question whether or not a state may exercise its police power through a
labor board.
In any event, the decision, being confined to the narrow ground of violence
in industrial controversies, does not represent a major inroad on the federal preemption doctrine but yet may prove a troublesome concession in area already
fraught with difficulty.
George M. Gibson

